Bank leverage procyclicality occurs when asset changes are financed with non-equity funding. Wholesale funding is one such funding that allows quick adjustment to leverage. Hence, banks with wholesale funding are expected to exhibit higher leverage procyclicality. Using Canadian data, we analyze (i) if leverage procyclicality exists and its dependence on wholesale funding, (ii) market factors associated with this procyclicality, and (iii) if banking-sector leverage procyclicality forecasts economic volatility. The findings suggest that procyclicality exists and its degree positively depends on the use to wholesale funding. Furthermore, funding-market liquidity matters for this procyclicality. Finally, banking-sector leverage procyclicality can forecast volatility in the equity market.
Introduction
In the aftermath of the recent financial crisis, the high levels of leverage among financial institutions has widely been identified as one of the major causes of the crisis. This has focused attention on both how financial institutions manage their leverage ratios (defined as assets divided by equity) and on what kind of regulatory actions might be required to prevent the build up of excessive levels of leverage in the financial sector. Given the nature and the severity of the recent financial crisis, leverage has quickly become one of the focal points of both the academic research and policy-oriented discussions related to financial stability.
While the slow build up of leverage over several years among financial institutions is an important issue, some studies also identify the higher frequency movements of leverage as important. In this regard, one major question has been raised: Is leverage procyclical with respect to economic activities, and if so, what is the implication for aggregate volatility in the economy? study procyclicality of financial institution leverage in the United States and find evidence that such procyclicality exists and can forecast aggregate volatility. One channel in which this procyclicality can be observed is when a financial institution actively manages its balance sheet with respect to changes in the value of equity. For example, when the value of equity increases due to a rise in the prices of some marked-to-market assets, the financial institution's leverage ratio decreases. If the financial institution actively manages its balance sheet, it can raise non-equity liabilities and lever back up. In this process, the newly raised liabilities are invested in new assets leading to a positive relationship between changes in leverage and in balance sheet size. As prices of assets tend to increase during booms and decrease during busts, leverage becomes procyclical. This paper highlights the interaction of leverage procyclicality with the use of wholesale funding. The degree of procyclicality is not constant across different types of financial institutions and with respect to the changes in macroeconomic and market environments. Financial institutions that use wholesale funding (e.g., institutional deposits, repos, commercial paper and banker's acceptances) display high degrees of procyclicality as these market-based funds are readily available at short notice for quick adjustments to leverage. However, the crisis disrupted short-term wholesale funding markets, revealing the high funding liquidity risks of these funds. With reduced access to wholesale funding, financial institutions lost the ability to adjust leverage easily and quickly, which dampened the degree of procyclicality.
More specifically, we have three main objectives. First, we show that leverage of Canadian financial institutions is procyclical (i.e., positive correlations between leverage and the balance sheet size) and that the degree of procyclicality depends on the usage of wholesale funding. Second, we identify macroeconomic and market variables that are important for the degree of procyclicality. Third, we study if banking-sector leverage procyclicality can forecast aggregate or industry-wide volatility in the equity market. The empirical strategy chosen to achieve the first two objectives is a two-step method, similar to the approach outlined by Kashyap and Stein (2000) in their work on the banking lending channel of monetary policy. The first step cross-sectionally estimates the degree of leverage procyclicality based on monthly bank-level balance sheet data for all federally chartered deposit taking institutions in Canada over the period [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] . The analysis for the first objective is derived from the outcome of this step. Then, the second step tries to determine if and how the degree of procyclicality changes over time following macroeconomic and market-wide changes. The results from this step are used for the discussion of the second objective. For the third objective, we derive the GARCH-implied volatility in both the Toronto Stock Exchange Broad Index and the Financial Index as a measure of aggregate and industry-wide volatility, respectively. We regress each of these volatility measures on a measure of banking-sector leverage procyclicality.
With respect to the first objective, we find strong procyclicality of leverage. In addition, we find significantly higher degrees of procyclicality among financial institutions that use more wholesale funding over those that use less. This confirms the findings by that leverage among U.S. investment banks, who mainly rely on market-based wholesale funding to fund their investment activities, is strongly procyclical. They do not find such leverage procyclicality for commercial banks who rely less on wholesale funding.
Secondly, we find that degrees of procyclicality change with liquidity in short-term wholesale funding markets, where market liquidity is measured as either the trading volume or the volume of outstanding instruments. Specifically, for high wholesale funding users, we find that procyclicality is high when the liquidity of repo and banker's acceptance markets is also high. When these markets become illiquid, high wholesale funding users, who depend on these funding sources, lose the ability to quickly adjust leverage, leading to weaker procyclicality of leverage. This result is also consistent with Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) who provide a theory linking market liquidity (i.e., the ease with which an asset is traded) with funding liquidity (i.e., the ease with which funds are obtained) through margin requirements for financial intermediaries. Since margin requirements for raising funds (e.g., haircuts on collateral and discounts on bank debts) can increase during downturns, available funds for investment decrease, reducing market liquidity. Such market and funding illiquidity would show up as weaker procyclicality of leverage, as the financial institution's ability to adjust leverage and investment declines. We observe weaker procyclicality with illiquid market conditions only for those financial institutions that rely on short-term wholesale funding markets.
Finally, we find that lagged banking-sector leverage procyclicality forecasts GARCH-implied equity market volatility. The effect of leverage procyclicality is positive and significant during the pre-crisis period, and more positive but insignificant during the crisis period. We interpret this result as banking-sector leverage procyclicality being able to forecast overall economic volatility and its potential impact becoming stronger during the crisis period. There are, however, multiple other factors that would have contributed to the movements in economic volatility during the crisis such as various global and domestic government/central bank interventions, leaving the estimate insignificant.
Our analysis of the findings leads to several policy discussions. First, Canadian financial institutions we analyze all face a bank-specific regulatory leverage ceiling called the "asset-to-capital multiple", or ACM, limit. 1 One may argue that our procyclicality result is an outcome of financial institutions facing the binding leverage limit. When financial institutions attempt to remain at the bound of the leverage limit, any exogenously driven deviation from the limit (e.g., a shock to asset prices or the value of equity) may be met by an endogenous reaction by the financial institutions to return to the pre-shock level, which could enhance procyclical movements. In the first step of the empirical method discussed above, we control for potential effects of the leverage limit on procyclicality. Even after controlling for the regulatory limit, leverage is procyclical. Hence, especially given our result on the positive relationship between banking-sector leverage procyclicality and economic volatility, more studies are needed to identify the causality of this relationship. If procyclicality does cause volatility, other regulations may be necessary to control it. 2 Our paper is related to several other literatures. Regarding wholesale funding of banks, Huang and Ratnovski (2010) analyze a model with a tradeoff between using wholesale funding vs. retail deposits. On one hand, wholesale funding improves efficiency as uninsured wholesale financiers monitor banks. The monitoring incentives of the financiers, however, depend on the available information set, which could lead to inefficient liquidations. This study is similar to ours in spirit, since it also evaluates the decisions and the riskiness of banks under different funding structures (retail deposits vs. wholesale funding). Our study is also related to the literature on the regulation of bank leverage, since banks in Canada face regulatory leverage limits. Blum (2008) provides a theoretical motivation for leverage limits in a world where the supervisor knows that different types of banks (safe vs.
1 The Office of Superintendent of Financial Institutions regulates and supervises federally chartered financial institutions in Canada.
2 Some of the new regulations under discussion may reduce this procyclicality. For example, in September 2010, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) has announced a substantial strengthening of existing capital requirements, including potential counter-cyclical capital buffers, where the required capital increases during booms and decreases during busts. Such a regulation would directly reduce leverage procyclicality. In addition, the BCBS has been discussing directly restricting banks' balance-sheet liquidity-risk management. In December 2009, the BCBS has published a consultative report on the framework for liquidity management that can be applied internationally. risky) exist, but it does not know the actual risk types of banks. In such a setting, asking banks to assess and report their own risks (in a manner similar to Basel II) is not optimal, since risky banks will have an incentive to understate their risks. Blum (2008) shows that having a simple leverage ratio cap along with capital requirements based on banks' internal risk assessments can result in truthful revelations of banks' risk levels. Geanakoplos (2010) theoretically analyzes adverse effects of leverage fluctuations in the environment where leverage is determined in equilibrium together with interest rates. The paper shows how leverage cycles damage the economy and argues for regulations to control them. Bordeleau, Crawford, and Graham (2009) discuss the historical evolution of regulatory leverage limits in Canada and analyze how large Canadian banks manage leverage with respect to these limits. They find some large banks maintain a buffer between their leverage and the regulatory limit. Committee on the Global Financial System (2009) provides some international policy discussions regarding leverage procyclicality.
The rest of the study is as follows: Section 2 presents some basic balance sheet arithmetic to explain the link between asset growth and leverage growth. Section 3 provides a brief overview of the Canadian banking sector, an important regulatory change, and the evolution of the regulatory leverage limit (ACM limit). Section 4 presents the data. Section 5 explains the empirical methodology and Section 6 describes the results for the first two objectives. Section 7 analyzes the relationship between banking-sector leverage procyclicality and economic volatility. Section 8 discusses our robustness checks. Finally, Section 9 concludes.
Asset Changes vs. Leverage Changes
Our findings of leverage procyclicality are based on positive correlations between asset growth and leverage growth. 3 In this section, we discuss how such a positive correlation can emerge from a bank actively managing its balance sheet. Furthermore, this basic balance sheet arithmetic also demonstrates how the strength of leverage procyclicality is influenced by the funding sources used by a financial intermediary (wholesale funding vs. retail deposits). Consider the simplified balance sheets for two banks that use different funding sources, where Bank 1 is funded by wholesale funding and Bank 2 by retail deposits: The leverage ratio of a bank is L = A/E, where L is leverage, A is total assets and E is equity. Given these balance sheets, the leverage ratio for both banks is 200/10 = 20. Now suppose that both the size of the asset portfolio and the amount of equity rises by $2 for each bank. Such an increase in assets and equity could be caused by the bank issuing new equity in order to purchase more assets, or it can be a result of an increase in the price of marked-to-market securities, which gets reflected in the banks' net worth as in . Under both scenarios, the leverage ratio will become 202/12 = 16.83 for both banks. The result is the following balance sheets: It is, however, possible that the banks will not remain passive and they will decide to "actively manage" their balance sheets. The banks could attempt to return their leverage ratios to the previous level of 20, which can be done by raising more funds and using these funds to purchase more assets (e.g., securities). Bank 1, with its access to liquid wholesale funding markets, is likely to be able to raise the required funds ($38). On the other hand, since Bank 2 depends exclusively on retail deposits, it will be less able to quickly raise funds, given the "sluggish" nature of retail deposits. Assuming that Bank 2 is only able to raise half of the required funds ($19) in a given period, the balance sheets of these two institutions become: 4 Now the leverage ratio of Bank 1 is 240/12 = 20, whereas the leverage ratio of Bank 2 is 221/12 = 18.41. Furthermore, if the initial change in the value of equity is the result of an asset price change with marked-to-market accounting, it would affect all banks with the same markedto-market security on the balance sheet. This initial increase in the asset price could result in a further increase in the price of this security, and the value of the securities might appreciate further, triggering another round of adjustments as described above. This is the "feedback effect" discussed by (or similarly the "spiral effect" by Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) ) since the increase in the value of the marked-to-marked assets (and the bank's desire to actively manage its balance sheet) is the cause of the adjustment process and the possible spiral that follows.
This example illustrates two things: leverage is procyclical and leverage procyclicality is stronger for banks that use wholesale funding (Bank 1). In the first stage of the example, the change in assets and leverage is identical for both banks: a relatively small increase in assets (1%) leads to a fairly large drop in leverage (approximately 16%). In the second stage, however, both the balance sheet size and leverage increase at a fast rate for Bank 1, since it is able to raise all of the funds required to restore its old leverage ratio. The growth rates for assets and leverage both equal 19%, approximately. On the other hand, assets and leverage grow at a slower pace for Bank 2, since it is unable to raise as many funds as Bank 1. For Bank 2, the growth rates of assets and leverage both approximately equal 9.4%. Given that the growth rates were identical for the two banks in the first stage, it is clear that the correlation between asset growth and leverage growth will be higher for Bank 1 ([1%, -16%], [19%, 19%] ) than for Bank 2 ([1%, -16%], [9.4%, 9.4%]). When extended to additional stages, a feedback effect can generate a series of observations which will confirm positive correlations for both banks (i.e., leverage procyclicality) and a higher correlation for Bank 1, the wholesale funded bank. This is solely due to the fact that Bank 1 is able to quickly raise funds to adjust its leverage. 5 Figure 1 shows the scatter-plots of annual leverage growth rate and asset growth rate for all federally chartered Canadian commercial banks between 1994 and 2009. 6 In this graph, each point corresponds to a bank-year combination. A positive correlation is observed when the points are aligned along a positively sloped line -assets and leverage change in the same direction. The correlation coefficient is 0.734, a highly positive relationship between changes in assets and changes in leverage. Our study focuses on Canadian financial institutions, however for a comparison, we plot the same graph for selected U.S. depository institutions between 1993 and 2007 in Figure 2 . 7 The correlation coefficient is 0.212 in the U.S., a much smaller number than for Canada. 8 Adrian and Shin (2010) present a similar scatter-plot for the average growth rates of assets and liquidity for all U.S. commercial banks between 1963 to 2006. In their graph, however, there is no positive relationship between asset growth and leverage growth. Furthermore, similar scatterplots presented by Panetta and Angelini (2009) do not show a positive asset growth-leverage growth relationship in Germany, France, Italy and Japan. Interestingly, Panetta and Angelini (2009) do observe a positive relationship between asset growth and leverage growth in the United Kingdom.
[INSERT FIGURES 1 AND 2 HERE]

Canadian Banking Sector
In this section, we briefly discuss the Canadian banking sector and provide an overview of important regulatory developments (particularly the "asset-to-capital multiple" or ACM limit) in Canada. Following this overview, the empirical analysis presented in Section 4 below will further examine the positive relationship between asset growth and leverage growth in Canada.
Overview
It can be argued that the Canadian banking sector has always had a relatively stable structure. Prior to 1980, the financial system had five segments: chartered banks, trust and loan companies, securities dealers, co-operative credit institutions, and life insurance companies. Of these, federally chartered banks were historically involved in commercial lending, whereas trust and loan companies specialized in collecting term deposits and making residential mortgage loans. Co-operative credit institutions, which are chartered and regulated by the provinces, have traditionally concentrated on retail deposits, residential mortgages and personal loans (Allen and Engert (2007) ).
Due to nationwide branch banking arrangements, the sector has always been dominated by a 7 We include 24 U.S. commercial banks and savings & loans (S&Ls) that form an approximate "peer group" of the Canadian commercial banks in Figure 1 . The construction of this peer list is loosely based on Allen and Engert (2007) .
8 Explaining the possible causes of the much stronger positive relationship between asset and leverage growth in Canada (compared to the U.S., and other countries) are beyond the scope of this study. Given our focus on the role of wholesale funding in determining leverage, however, a comparison between wholesale funding use by Canadian and U.S. banks could be desirable. Unfortunately, constructing an "internationally comparable wholesale funding use" measure is very difficult due to a lack of data. few very large banks. Currently, around 88.5% of all banking sector assets are held by six large banks, known as the "Big Six." 9 A number of smaller foreign or domestically-owned banks provide competition to these six very large banks in certain geographic areas (e.g. Western Canada and Quebec) or lines of business (e.g. internet-only banks competing for small retail deposits). Therefore, the Canadian banking sector can be characterized as having a dominant core and a competitive fringe.
Important Change in Regulatory Environment
An important feature of the Canadian banking sector is that the Bank Act, the legislation that governs banks, includes a requirement for a periodic and formal review process of the rules and regulations regarding financial institutions. This "sunset provision" has led to a number of important legislative amendments since 1980 (Allen and Engert (2007) ). One such regulation is directly relevant for our analysis. The 1987 Amendments to the Bank Act allowed banks, which already could have subsidiaries in the areas of venture capital and mortgage lending, to invest in or own securities dealers, and to invest in corporate securities. All of the large and some of the small chartered banks eventually acquired or founded a securities dealer. As a consequence, no large, independent Canadian securities dealers remained by the mid-1990s. Thus, the financial institutions in our analysis can own investment banking subsidiaries. Our data consist of regulatory reports which give consolidated financial information and do not separately provide activities of different divisions and subsidiaries. 10
Leverage Ratio Limits and Their Evolution
Another important feature of the Canadian banking sector is the presence of a regulatory leverage ceiling. As discussed by Bordeleau, Crawford, and Graham (2009) , Canada is one of the few countries that has had a long-standing limit on leverage ratios. The leverage ceiling, known as the ACM limit, was introduced in 1982, following a period of high leverage ratios among major Canadian banks. Leverage is measured using the following regulatory definition in Canada:
Leverage =
Total balance sheet assets + Certain off-balance sheet assets Total regulatory capital The evolution of the ACM limit between 1994 and 2009 can be divided into two distinct periods. During the 1990s, a formal limit of 20 was applied quite uniformly across all institutions, although the supervisors used their discretionary powers to impose lower limits on smaller and/or newly founded financial institutions. The supervisory bank data used in this study contains the ACM limits for 26 banks and 22 trust and loan companies from 1997 Q4 to 1999 Q4 (ACM limit data is unavailable for 1994Q1-1997Q3). Most of these institutions had an ACM limit of 20 during the entire period between 1997 Q4 and 1999 Q4, although some reported an ACM limit below 20.
After 2000, banks that satisfy a certain set of criteria have been allowed to increase their ACM limit to as high as 23. The standard ACM limit of 20 is still maintained, although the regulators do apply a lower ACM limit to certain institutions. The available data confirms that there was much less uniformity in the ACM limits set on individual banks after 2000. Currently, ACM limit data exists for 23 banks and 29 trust and loan companies for the period 2000 Q1 and 2009 Q4. Of these, the majority of banks and about half of trust and loan companies reported having an ACM limit of 20 during the entire period. Several institutions had a limit above 20 for at least part of the period, while others reported a limit below 20 at least once (or sometimes for the entire period). Overall, the ACM limit appears to have been more variable during this period, with more financial institutions having a leverage limit either above or below the standard limit of 20.
In their study of regulatory leverage constraints in Canada, Bordeleau, Crawford, and Graham (2009) argue that the major Canadian banks do not like to operate too close to their limit. Instead, these banks tend to keep a "leverage buffer" in order to minimize the risk of balance sheet volatility (such as trading activity) pushing leverage above the limit. The presence of such a buffer between a bank's leverage and its leverage limit can play a role in determining the link between asset growth and leverage growth. This issue will be further discussed below.
Data
The bank balance sheet data used in this study comes from the Tri-Agency Database System (TDS) of the Bank of Canada, Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions (OSFI) and the Canadian Deposit Insurance Corporation (CDIC). The TDS database contains the monthly balance sheet and off-balance sheet information, along with the quarterly income statement information, reported by financial institutions. Although there exist data going back to January 1981, some series did not begin until after 2000, while other series were terminated and/or replaced due to accounting rule changes. As a result, only certain broad measures, such as total assets, total equity, retail deposits, wholesale deposits, total loans and total securities, can be tracked across the entire sample period. Most of the subitems under these broad categories become available only much later than 1981. This imposes some constraints on the design of the empirical analysis, which will be discussed below. Nevertheless, TDS is an extensive database and it has the advantage of providing balance sheet data at a higher frequency than the data used in other studies in the literature. This study uses data that covers the period January 1994 to December 2009.
Although TDS provides data on a universe of 224 domestic banks, foreign bank subsidiaries, foreign bank branches and trust and loan companies (active or inactive), some of these institutions had to be eliminated from the study. The foreign bank branches that were established in Canada following the regulatory changes in 1999 had to be eliminated, since they do not report any equity (making it impossible to calculate their leverage ratio). Also, banks and trust and loan companies that are fully owned subsidiaries of a chartered bank or a trust and loan company were also eliminated, since their parent institution already reports a consolidated balance sheet. 11 The remaining 136 Canadian financial institutions form the sample that was used in the study. Overall, the data set contains 12,949 bank-month combinations.
The bank-level balance sheet data is also supplemented by macroeconomic and market-wide variables, such as GDP growth rate, and market liquidity measures. These variables were all obtained from the "Bank of Canada Banking and Financial Statistics." 12 5 Empirical Analysis: Methodology As discussed above, the first two objectives of this study are (i) to identify the link between leverage growth and asset growth among Canadian financial institutions, and to determine how this link interacts with banks' funding (specifically their use of wholesale funds) and (ii) to examine whether shocks in macroeconomic and market conditions affect the asset growth-leverage growth relationship. The empirical strategy chosen to achieve these goals is a two-step method, similar to the approach outlined by Kashyap and Stein (2000) in their work on the banking lending channel of monetary policy and subsequently used by Campello (2002) and Certorelli and Goldberg (2008) .
In broad terms, the outline of the two-step approach is as follows: in the first step, the sensitivity 11 However, if a bank or a trust and loan company operated independently any time between 1994 and 2009 before being acquired, then it was included in the sample for the period during which it was an independent entity. There were 13 such cases.
12 Available at http://www.bankofcanada.ca/en/bfsgen.html.
of leverage growth to asset growth, i.e., the degree of leverage procyclicality, (∂∆Leverage/∂∆Assets) is cross-sectionally estimated using bank-level balance sheet data only. Then, the second step of the analysis tries to determine if and how these sensitivities change over time following macroeconomic and market-wide liquidity shocks, i.e., changes in the degree of procyclicality over time. Therefore, only macroeconomic and market-wide financial variables are used in this second step.
While identifying the link between leverage growth and asset growth, we also consider the degree of heterogeneity among Canadian banks' funding portfolios. 13 It is possible that banks with access to liquid wholesale funding markets can adjust their leverage ratios more quickly, compared to banks that rely on illiquid funding sources (such as retail deposits) or equity, which can be more costly to raise. Accordingly, Canadian banks were categorized based on how much wholesale funding they use. "Wholesale funding use" of a bank is thereby defined as:
%WSF =
Non-personal deposits + Repos + Banker's Acceptances Total Liabilities + Equity
Using this definition, Canadian banks can be divided into three categories: (a) high degree of wholesale funding users-High WSF, (b) low degree of wholesale funding users-Low WSF, and (c) banks that don't use wholesale funds-No WSF. For banks that do use wholesale funding, the median of the %WSF ratio was calculated for each month, and banks above (below) the median were placed in the High WSF (Low WSF) group. This categorization was individually performed for each of the 192 months in the sample (January 1994 to December 2009). Such a categorization naturally raises the issue of a bank's "access" to wholesale funding markets vs. its "use" of such funds. Specifically, a bank that chooses not to raise any wholesale funds would be in the No WSF group along with a bank that has no access to wholesale funding markets. The former bank, however, can decide at any time to access wholesale funding markets, switching either to the Low WSF or High WSF group. The patterns in the data, however, suggest that banks do not frequently change their intensity of wholesale funding use. Table 1 presents a simple "transition matrix" showing the probability of a bank remaining in the same category vs. switching to a different category between time t and t + 1. As seen from this transition matrix, switches between categories is a relatively rare event: out of a total of 12,949 bank-month combinations, there are only 604 cases where a bank switches categories between t and t + 1. As such, the concerns related to frequent switches between categories appear to be alleviated for the Canadian case. 14 Table 2 below presents some summary statistics for the entire sample of banks, along with different groups of banks based on their wholesale funding use. In addition to the number of banks, summary statistics for leverage, leverage growth (∆Leverage) and asset growth (∆Assets) are also presented. The variation in the number of banks within the No WSF group during the sample period is due to the nature of the data set. TDS does not contain balance sheet data for trust and loan companies before January 1996. Since many trust and loan companies do not hold wholesale funding, their absence from the data set during the January 1994 -December 1995 period causes the No WSF category to have very few observations. Once the trust and loan companies enter the data set in January 1996, most of this variation is eliminated. The summary statistics in Table 2 suggest that No WSF banks have lower leverage ratios compared to the rest, but the leverage behaviour of the High WSF and Low WSF banks are similar. Although the average monthly rates of change in assets and leverage are smaller than ±1%, there is some variation both within and between different groups of banks, which is what we elaborate on below in the empirical analysis.
[ INSERT TABLE 2 HERE] Finally, Table 3 provides an average balance-sheet portfolio of all banks and for each wholesale funding group in December 2009. The numbers are un-weighted averages of percentage of total assets across banks. The average bank has half of its assets in loans and the rest in cash, securities and others. On the funding side, two-thirds of assets are funded by non-equity funding, but the percentage of wholesale funding increases across wholesale funding groups by design. The average bank in the High WSF group funds 57% of assets by wholesale funding. For the Low WSF group, wholesale funding makes up only 9% of total assets. Retail deposits are the important source of funding for the Low WSF group, amounting to 58% of total assets. The No WSF group tends to finance assets mostly by equity. Loans make up most of the asset side for High and Low WSF banks with 59% and 61% of total assets, respectively. The High WSF group owns a much higher fraction of riskier non-mortgage loans than safer mortgage loans (46% and 17%, respectively) relative to the Low WSF group (26% and 35%, respectively). The average No WSF bank holds relatively more highly liquid assets, such as cash and government bonds. Among assets that are subject to the market price risk, there are private sector securities and derivative related securities. The High and Low WSF groups have 11% and 7% of their total assets, respectively, in these securities.
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE]
and market-wide movements fairly well. As a result, many banks stay in the same category with high probabilities.
Empirical Analysis: First Step
In the first step of the empirical analysis, we run two sets of regressions. The procyclicality of leverage is analyzed for all banks together in the first set (Equation 1) and for three groups in the second (Equation 2). These two sets of regressions are independently run for each month:
where Leverage i,t = (Assets i,t /Total Regulatory Capital i,t ) and Assets i,t is the total balance sheet assets of bank i at time t. This first step regression is very similar to the regressions run by , since the dependent variable is the growth rate of leverage, and both the lagged leverage ratio (in logs) and the growth rate of assets are included as independent variables. However in Equation 2, in order to account for heterogeneity in the link between leverage and asset growth among banks, ∆Log(Assets i,t ) is also interacted with the wholesale-funding group dummies, where the High WSF group is the omitted category.
The first step regressions given in Equations 1 and 2 also include a number of control variables. A bank with a liquid asset portfolio might be more likely to increase its leverage ratio, since it would be able to quickly sell assets if it were unable to refinance some of its debt in the future. Therefore, Liquid i,t = (Securities owned i,t /Assets i,t ) is included as a control variable. M erger i,t is a dummy variable that takes the value one if the bank was involved in a merger or acquisition during the previous six months, since such activity is likely to impact leverage.
The final independent variable is ACM Limit i,t , which is the leverage ratio ceiling placed on a bank at time t. As discussed above, the data used in this study does not contain information on the ACM limits of individual banks for 1994Q1 -1997Q3, and for the period between 1997Q4 and 2009Q4, ACM limits are observed only for some banks. In order to include the ACM limit in the first step regression, the missing ACM limit data was generated using a simple procedure that uses Tobit regressions. This procedure involves regressing the ACM limits observed in the data set on a number of bank-specific variables and using the regression coefficients to generate fitted values for the missing ACM limits. 15
The estimation of Equations 1 and 2 separately for each month involves running 192 individual regressions per equation. The estimated coefficients for ∆Log(Assets) i,t and its interactions are then used as dependent variables in the second step regression discussed below. In this setting, α 1 from Equation 1 measures the correlation between asset growth and leverage growth for all banks combined. In addition, β 1 from Equation 2 is the correlation between leverage and asset growth for high wholesale funding users, whereas (β 1 + β 2 ) and (β 1 + β 3 ) capture this relationship for the low wholesale funding users and no wholesale funding users, respectively. In essence, the first step of the analysis generates the estimates of a separate time series of (∂∆Leverage/∂∆Assets) for all banks combined and for each wholesale funding group, with 192 observations in each time series.
Empirical Analysis: Second Step
This second step involves the estimation of the following time series regression, separately, for all banks combined and for each WSF group:
where j represents the different groupings of Canadian banks: j = 1 for all banks and j = 2, 3 and 4 based on their wholesale funding use, high, low and non, respectively. ξ j,t is constructed from the estimates in the first step such that ξ 1,t = α 1,t , ξ 2,t = β 1,t , ξ 3,t = β 1,t + β 2,t , and ξ 4,t = β 1,t + β 3,t . As discussed above, the second step of the empirical analysis only uses macroeconomic and market-wide financial variables to estimate the relationships between these variables and changes in the degree of leverage procyclicality. Some of these variables contain information on market and funding liquidity, which could play an important role in determining the asset growth -leverage growth relationship. As shown in the balance sheet examples above, procyclicality of leverage is influenced by how easily a bank can raise funds (funding liquidity) and how easily assets can be purchased or sold (market liquidity). The log change in the total volume of transactions in the repo market (∆ ln(Repo)) and the log change in the amount of outstanding banker's acceptances (∆ ln(BA)) control changes in funding liquidity. Meanwhile, the log change in the total amount of outstanding corporate short-term paper (∆ ln(CP )) captures changes in market liquidity. 16 All three variables are normalized by the money supply (M2), in order to capture relative changes in the size of repos, banker's acceptances (BA) and commercial paper (CP) markets relative to the more "traditional" source of liquidity, namely money. If the BA, CP and repo markets are growing faster than the money supply, this can signal "market-based financial intermediaries" playing a larger role in financial intermediation (Adrian, Moench, and Shin (2010) ). As such, these variables are of particular interest in the second step of the analysis. 17 A final measure of liquidity is the change in the spread between the 3 to 5 year Canadian Treasury rate and the 3 to 5 year corporate bond rate (∆Def ault t ). An increase in this "default spread" might indicate a flight to quality and lower liquidity in corporate bond markets.
The liquidity risk faced by Canadian banks is partially captured by the change in the slope of the yield curve. ∆T erm is change in the spread between the Canadian government bonds with a maturity of 10 years or more and the 3-month Canadian Treasury Bill. Given that inflation expectations are anchored at 2% by the inflation targeting monetary policy in Canada, a steepening of the yield curve will create opportunities for banks to borrow short-term funds and invest in long-term assets. Banks that follow this strategy can be expected to have a large and positive asset growth-leverage growth sensitivity, since the new assets would be purchased by debt. Furthermore, if many banks choose to pursue this strategy, this could result in the value of long-term securities to increase, which could potentially be a trigger for the "feedback effect" discussed by . The obvious downside of this balance-sheet management approach is the liquidity risk that the bank may not be able to rollover its short-term debt before the returns on the long-term assets are realized. In addition, the cost of raising equity is captured by the log change in the Toronto Stock Exchange Financial Index (∆ ln(TSX Fin)). If financial stocks are on an upward trend, then the cost of raising equity may be lower, compared to debt, weakening the link between leverage and asset growth. Furthermore, the monthly growth rate of GDP (∆ ln(GDP )) is included in the second step, since higher growth rates could reduce the costs of rolling over short-term debt, resulting in more assets being purchased by debt. Under this scenario, higher rates of GDP growth will strengthen the asset growth-leverage growth relationship in the Canadian banking sector. The status of monetary policy is captured by Overnight Rate, which is the overnight rate targeted by the Bank of Canada. Finally, Year End is a dummy variable that takes the value of one for the months of October and December. October marks the end of the fiscal year for some Canadian banks while other banks use December. Banks may choose to de-lever before the end of the fiscal year, independent of their asset portfolio. If so, then leverage growth can be less sensitive to asset growth towards the end of the fiscal year. 18
Before we present the results, it is necessary to discuss why this particular method was chosen. The obvious alternative to the two-step procedure is to nest Equation 3 into Equation 2 (or 17 Liquidity in BA and CP markets can be also be measured by their bid-ask spreads, since a liquid (illiquid) market will be more likely to have smaller (larger) bid-ask spreads. Although bid-ask spread data is available for Canadian BA and CP markets, including these variables along with, or instead of, the volume-based measures discussed above does not yield major changes in the findings.
18 As seen in Equation 3 , the first lag of all independent variables (except Year End and Overnight Rate) are included in the analysis as well. Studies such as Campello (2002) tend to include longer lags, but unfortunately since some of the data is unavailable for before January 1994, including additional lags places a burden on both the number of observations and degrees of freedom.
Equation 1) and run a panel regression. Kashyap and Stein (2000) and Campello (2002) discuss the benefits of the two-step methodology that allows for a different shock to have a time-dependent impact on leverage in each month. Therefore, it becomes less likely that the results of the first step (coefficients of ∆Log(Assets) i,t and its interactions) are influenced by unobserved factors. For example, the two-step procedure is able to account for a shock that leads to an increase in the leverage ratios of all banks in a given month. Furthermore, nesting Equation 3 into Equation 2 would force the variables in Equation 3 to effect leverage growth in a linear fashion, creating a more restricted structure. Finally, the two-step approach allows for the link between asset growth and leverage growth (i.e., the degree of procyclicality) to vary across time. Given the relatively long time-span of this study, it is reasonable to assume that the relationship between leverage and asset growth has changed over time. Some evidence of the coefficients of ∆Log(Assets) i,t and its interactions varying across time will be presented below, further validating the two-step approach. However, the two-step approach has its disadvantages. As discussed by Kashyap and Stein (2000) , a two-step specification tends have lower statistical power compared to a one-step method. Therefore, results of a one-step, panel data specification that nests Equation 3 into Equation 2 will also be discussed below as a robustness check.
Results
First Step Results
As discussed above, the first step of the analysis involves the estimation of Equations 1 and 2 for each month. During the estimation, in a manner similar to Campello (2002) , observations where |∆ ln(Leverage i,t )| ≥ 66% and/or |∆ ln(Assets i,t )| ≥ 66% were eliminated. This ensures that the results are not driven by outliers. Furthermore, the first six months of observations after an entry and the last six months of observations before an exit were eliminated, since the periods immediately following an entry or immediately preceding can involve large swings in assets and equity. The number of observations in each regression varied between 54 and 75 banks, as shown in Table 2 .
While analyzing the first step results, three important questions need to be answered: (a) What is the relationship between asset growth and leverage growth in the Canadian banking sector (or is there procyclicality of leverage)? (b) Does the relationship differ by wholesale funding use (or does the degree of procyclicality differ by groups)? (c) Does the relationship between leverage growth and asset growth evolve over time (or does the degree of procyclicality change over time)? 19 Table 4 summarizes the results of the coefficient estimates. The table shows the mean and the variance of 192 sets of the estimated coefficients in Equations 1 and 2 for all banks and wholesale funding groups, respectively. Since we focus on the estimates of α 1 , β 1 , β 1 +β 2 , and β 1 +β 3 , we mainly discuss these results. We interpret the estimated results of α 1 , β 1 , β 1 + β 2 , and β 1 + β 3 in Table 4 as follows. For all banks, when assets change by 1%, leverage changes by 0.833% in the same direction on average across time. Among High WSF banks, leverage changes by 0.933% with the asset change of 1%, whereas leverage of Low WSF and No WSF banks change by 0.786% (= 0.933 − 0.146) and 0.661% (= 0.933 − 0.272), respectively. As these are all positive numbers, leverage and assets move together, i.e., leverage is procyclical. Furthermore, as the wholesale funding use increases, leverage and assets move more closely to each other (i.e., the number becomes closer to 1), implying that the degree of procyclicality increases with wholesale funding. 20
[INSERT TABLE 4 HERE]
[INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE]
The variance column for wholesale funding groups in Table 4 shows that the variance of these 192 estimated parameters decrease with wholesale funding. Figure 3 visually shows this. The figure contains kernel density estimates based on 192 estimates of α 1 on the left panel, and β 1 , β 1 + β 2 , and β 1 + β 3 on the right panel. We observe a long left tail in all figures, implying that in some months assets and leverage moved in opposite directions. As seen in Section 2, this happens through passive balance sheet management or alternatively when asset purchases are funded by equity. On the right panel in Figure 3 , we also observe that the estimates of β 1 (i.e., for High WSF banks) show less variation than those of β 1 + β 2 (i.e., for Low WSF banks), and the estimates of β 1 + β 3 (i.e., for No WSF banks) show the most variation among three groups. 19 The answer to this question would justify the two-step approach, which allows for the coefficients of ∆ ln(Assets)i,t and its interactions to vary across time. That is, if leverage procyclicality is time dependent, the second-step analysis allows us to observe macroeconomic and market conditions that are associated with the changes in procyclicality over time.
20 Another potentially important determinant of leverage growth in the Canadian banking sector is the ACM limit. The mean of the coefficient estimate on ln(ACM Limit) in Table 4 suggests that the ACM limit has some positive impact on how banks adjust their leverage. When ln(ACM Limit) increases by one unit, the average increase in leverage is about 0.015% under both Equations 1 and 2. The "buffer" that some banks keep between their actual leverage ratios and the leverage ceiling (as discussed by Bordeleau, Crawford, and Graham (2009) ) is a possible explanation for this finding. If most banks keep such a buffer, then they could increase their leverage with their balance sheet size without worrying about violating their ceiling. In times of decreasing leverage in the banking sector, it is natural that the ceiling has no impact on the (negative) rate of leverage growth. This may be a reason that the 192 estimates of the coefficient of ln(ACM Limit) display high volatility over time in both equations, i.e., the high variances relative to the means in Table 4 .
Tables 5 and 6 further summarize the main findings of the first-step regressions and provide some answers to the evolution of leverage procyclicality over time. Table 5 presents the mean of the estimated asset growth-leverage growth sensitivities (i.e., the degree of leverage procyclicality) for all banks and each wholesale funding group, during the entire sample period, and during two sub-sample periods (the 1990s and 2000s ). Also presented are statistical tests comparing the means and variances of the estimated sensitivities for the same category across different time-periods. 21
[INSERT TABLE 5 HERE]
The analysis of the two sub-periods in Table 5 suggests the asset growth-leverage growth link weakened over time, especially, for banks with little or no wholesale funding. This observation is confirmed by the tests comparing the mean sensitivities across different time periods. The null hypothesis of equal means across different sub-periods is rejected for these banks. Furthermore, for the Low WSF group, the null hypothesis of the estimated coefficients (β 1 + β 2 ) having equal variance across time is also rejected. This time-variation in the means and the variances of the estimated coefficients across time for all three categories confirms the benefits of the two-step approach over the one-step approach. Table 6 presents comparisons of mean asset growth-leverage growth sensitivities across different wholesale funding categories for different periods. The comparisons confirm differences in the asset growth-leverage growth link across the different groups over the entire sample period, and especially during the 2000s. As seen on Panel B of Table 6 , the differences between the mean sensitivities of the three groups were not as significant during the 1990s, suggesting that most of the divergence occurred sometime during the 2000s. Whether these changes were due to macroeconomic or financial shocks will be the focus of the second step of the empirical analysis. Nevertheless, the big differences between the High WSF group and the other two groups are not very surprising. Based on the balance sheet examples discussed above, the link between asset growth and leverage growth is likely to be stronger for banks that are able to change their leverage ratio quickly. Banks that access wholesale funding markets can raise or retire debt more quickly, since the wholesale funding markets tend to be more liquid compared to retail deposit markets in normal times. 22
[INSERT TABLE 6 HERE]
21 Since the number of no wholesale funding user banks is very small during January 1994 and December 1995, the estimated coefficients for these 24 months are mostly driven by movements in the leverage ratios of one or two banks. As a result, the asset growth-leverage growth sensitivities for this group are not taken into consideration in Tables 5 and 6. 22 The significant variations across these different groups of Canadian banks also validate the inclusion of the wholesale funding use interactions in the first step of the analysis.
In summary, the first step of the analysis suggests that the relationship between asset growth and leverage growth in the Canadian banking sector (a) is positive, i.e., leverage is procyclical, (b) is dependent on wholesale funding use of banks, i.e., the degree of procyclicality increases with wholesale funding use, and (c) has evolved over time. Specifically, during the 1990s, changes in leverage ratios of all Canadian banks were relatively more procyclical and sensitive to changes in balance sheet size (as seen in Table 5 , mean sensitivities are higher than 0.85 for all three categories during this subperiod). There was a divergence in the 2000s, caused by the weakening of the asset growth-leverage growth relationship among banks that use little or no wholesale funding. Changes in leverage ratios of banks that use high levels of wholesale funding, however, continued to be very sensitive to changes in balance sheet size. It is possible that the asset growth-leverage growth correlations have a negative time trend, due to the expansion of non-intermediated funding markets reducing the traditional growth opportunities of banks (such as commercial loans) and limiting balance sheet growth rates. However, for the high wholesale funding banks, the development of wholesale funding markets and the use of these funds may have given them new growth opportunities and kept them from lowering the sensitivities relative to other banks. In the second step, we analyze these possibilities.
Second Step Results
The second step of the empirical analysis investigates the macroeconomic and market-wide variables associated with the change in the degree of leverage procyclicality of Canadian banks over time. This involves the time-series estimation of Equation 3 separately for each bank group: All, High WSF, Low WSF and No WSF banks.
The results of the second step are given in Table 7 below. These results strongly suggest that both funding and market liquidity matter for changes in the degree of leverage procyclicality in the Canadian banking sector. For example with all banks, the degree of leverage procyclicality increases when the liquidity of both the repo and the BA markets contemporaneously increases (i.e., the positive and significant coefficient of ∆ ln(Repo) and ∆ ln(BA)). Specifically, as the repo market transaction volume increases by 1%, the co-movement of assets and leverage (measured by the estimated coefficients of ∆ ln(Assets) in Equation 1) increase by 0.0019, and similarly by 0.0197 for an 1% increase in the outstanding BA. In addition, the default and term spreads seem to be important for the degree of leverage procyclicality (i.e., the significant coefficient of ∆Def ault and ∆T erm −1 ). With an increase in default risk, the degree of leverage procyclicality decreases, weakening the link between assets and leverage. This can be intuitive if the observed assets-leverage link arises out of greater risk-taking behaviour by banks. A lagged term spread increase tends to occur with higher leverage procyclicality. A higher term spread may create an incentive to hold greater maturity mismatches by purchasing long-term assets with short-term debts, leading to a stronger positive link between leverage and assets. Finally, an increase in the overnight rate coincides with a higher degree of procyclicality. As discussed below, No WSF banks appear to be important for this result.
Regarding the results on different wholesale funding groups, changes in liquidity in the repo market (as measured by turnover) have positive and significant coefficients for both high and low WSF banks. This finding confirms , who argue that the active management of a financial institution's balance sheet requires frequent access to repo markets. This is especially true for U.S. investment banks, whose asset growth-leverage growth relationship is highly positive. The positive and significant coefficient of ∆ ln(Repo) suggests that more liquid repo markets make it easier for wholesale funding users to take positions in financial markets, perhaps fueling the "feedback effect" of in some parts of the Canadian banking sector.
For the High WSF group, the asset growth-leverage growth relationship is also stronger (more positive) when the BA market is more liquid, due to an increase in the amount of outstanding BA. In Canada, large and established banks use BA as an important source of funding. As most of such banks likely belong to the high wholesale funding group, the result is reasonable. Meanwhile, the growth rate of outstanding CP has a positive and significant coefficient for the Low WSF group. Increased liquidity in CP or BA markets can signal easier access to asset and/or funding markets for these institutions, which can then be used to purchase assets, leading to higher procyclicality. Alternatively, higher turnover can also cause an appreciation in the value of the CP held by Low WSF banks, which can trigger the "feedback effect" discussed by . Taken together, the coefficients for ∆ ln(Repo), ∆ ln(BA), and ∆ ln(CP ) point to easier access to wholesale funds (i.e. when the markets are more liquid) resulting in more assets being financed with debt and a higher correlation between asset growth and leverage growth.
[INSERT TABLE 7 HERE]
The impact of macroeconomic factors on leverage procyclicality is limited to the No WSF group. The asset growth-leverage growth relationship is positive with respect to GDP for this group. Additionally, the overnight rate has a positive and significant coefficient. The positive coefficients of ∆ ln(GDP ) and Overnight Rate could both be capturing easier access to retail deposits and an abundance of growth opportunities during a booming economy. Finally, the No WSF banks tend to reduce their leverage procyclicality (and liquidity risk) towards the end of the fiscal year.
Overall, the second step of the analysis suggests that the degree of leverage procyclicality among Canadian banks is significantly impacted by liquidity-related macroeconomic and market-wide variables. Liquidity in the repo, BA and CP markets plays at least some role in determining the magnitude of this relationship, depending on the degree of wholesale funding use. For both High WSF and Low WSF banks, the repo market matters. Since these banks might be pursuing active trading strategies, their ability to use repo markets to take trading positions can impact their leverage behaviours. The CP and BA markets may also determine the asset growth-leverage growth relationship, since borrowing funds for asset purchases is more likely to take place in these markets.
Leverage Procyclicality and Aggregate Volatility
Regarding the third objective of the study, this section analyzes how banking-sector leverage procyclicality can forecast aggregate or industry-wide volatility. Leverage procyclicality of individual banks could be linked to aggregate or industry-wide volatility. This section studies empirical evidence for these potential links. Specifically, suppose an initial change in the balance sheet in Section 2 is caused by a change in the price of bank assets (i.e., the Adrian and Shin channel). Due to the balance sheet adjustments explained in Section 2, overall demand for bank assets increases. Given that the initial price change affects all banks with similar portfolios, the banking-industry demand for assets increases. This feeds back into additional increase in the asset price, leading to another round of balance sheet adjustments and increased demand for assets. Hence, small fluctuations in price could amplify asset price volatility for the industry or in the aggregate through an individual bank's balance sheet adjustments.
In order to investigate whether this potential link between leverage procyclicality and aggregate or industry-wide volatility exists in Canada, we analyze if the banking-sector co-movements of assets and leverage can forecast aggregate or industry-wide volatility by estimating the following regressions:
where V olatility t is the aggregate equity market volatility, measured by the volatilities implied by a GARCH(1,1) model, which is standard in the finance literature (Engle (2001) ). We consider the volatility of the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX) Broad Index, and the TSX Financial Index. These GARCH-implied volatilities are calculated using daily returns for the period January 1990 -December 2009 and are averaged over a month. Although our bank data set starts in January 1994, we use daily returns extending back to January 1990, in order to improve the estimation of GARCH-implied volatility for the earlier months in the sample. Figure 4 presents these two implied volatility series.
[ INSERT FIGURE 4 HERE] In Equations 4 and 5, Correlation t captures the correlation between the asset growth and leverage growth rates of Canadian banks in each month and it proxies for the degree of leverage procyclicality. Although the first-step regression coefficients from Section 6.1 also capture the degree of leverage procyclicality, they are unsuitable to be included as independent variables in Equations 4 and 5 due to the "generated regressor" problem. Instead, the following procedure was used to calculate Correlation t : for each month, the correlation between ∆ln(Assets) and ∆ln(Leverage) is calculated across banks. We weight individual bank observations by the amount of wholesale funding used by each bank. 23 This averaging yields the banking sector-wide asset growth-leverage growth correlation coefficient used in Equations 4 and 5 (with one lag).
In addition, Equation 5 includes a dummy for the recent financial crisis (Crisis t ) that equals one for the months between July 2007 and December 2009. This crisis dummy is also interacted with Correlation t−1 in order to investigate the impact of leverage procyclicality on aggregate or industry-wide volatility during periods of financial stress.
[INSERT TABLE 8 HERE]
The estimation results for Equations 4 and 5 are given in Table 8 . The left panel of the table presents the estimation results with TSX Broad Index volatility as the dependent variable and the right panel with TSX Financial Index volatility. First, the estimation results of Equation 4 show that higher leverage procyclicality (i.e., higher Correlation term) weakly forecasts higher TSX Broad Index volatility, implying a potential positive link between bank leverage procyclicality and aggregate volatility. Furthermore, the results from Equation 5 suggest that this positive link is more significantly observed during the pre-crisis period than during the crisis period, as the lagged Correlation term has positive and significant (at 5%) effects on TSX Broad Index volatility while the interaction term, Correlation · Crisis, exhibits positive but non-significant effects. Results with TSX Financial Index volatility show similar effects, implying that leverage procyclicality forecasts industry-wide volatility, especially, during the pre-crisis period.
Overall, these findings suggest that there is a positive link between leverage procyclicality of 23 Results based on asset-weighted correlations are similar.
the banking sector and volatility of the economy. This positive link is significant in the pre-crisis period and seems to become stronger (i.e., the point estimates of the Correlation · Crisis term are much higher than the Correlation term) but less significant during the crisis. It is likely that leverage procyclicality (e.g., de-leveraging by asset fire sales) was an important factor in the crisistime volatility of the economy, however, multiple other factors would also have been important. For example, various domestic and global government/central bank interventions would have contributed to the reduction in volatility observed during 2009 in Figure 4 , independently from banking-sector leverage procyclicality.
8 Robustness: A "One-Step" Panel Data Approach As discussed above, an alternative approach to the "two-step" methodology of Kashyap and Stein (2000) is to nest the second step equation (Equation 3) into the first step (Equation 2). 24 This "onestep" approach will take advantage of the panel nature of the data and may have more statistical power. Therefore, this specification can serve as a useful robustness check. 25
In specifying the one-step model, attention needs to be paid to the nature of the dependent variable. As discussed above, the main goals of this study are to determine the correlation between asset growth and leverage growth in Canadian banking sector, and to examine whether this correlation depends on banks' funding portfolios. Accordingly, the dependent variable for the one-step specification needs to reflect the correlation between asset growth and leverage growth for each bank at each time period. Based on this need, the dependent variable was specified as:
where µ ∆A is the mean asset growth rate and µ ∆L is the mean leverage growth rate. Similarly, SD ∆A and SD ∆L are the standard deviations of the asset growth rate and the leverage growth rate. These means and standard deviations can be calculated either (a) across banks for each time period (for time t across all i), or (b) across time periods for each bank (for bank i across all t). 26 Using this dependent variable, the following equation can be estimated, where the main variables of interest are interacted with wholesale funding use dummies:
In Equation 6, the variables with the γ coefficients are for the macroeconomic/market-wide variables, whereas the ω coefficients are for the bank-level variables. ψ i is a bank-specific effect. As the dependent variable can be calculated in two ways, this equation was estimated under two methodologies. First, the means and standard deviations of ln(Leverage) and ln(Assets) were calculated for each bank across time and Equation 6 was estimated using a random-effects specification. Then, the means and standard deviations were calculated for each time period, across all banks and Equation 6 was estimated using a fixed-effects specification (both of these choices were confirmed by Hausman tests). Banks with less than 40 observations were dropped from the sample in each case. To ensure that the findings are not driven by outliers, dependent variable observations in the 1st and 99th percentiles of the two distributions were winsorised.
[INSERT TABLE 9 HERE]
The results of the two different one-step specifications, which are presented in Table 9 , are broadly in line with the findings of the two-step analysis discussed above. The asset growth-leverage growth correlations are higher for High WSF banks, since Low i,t and N o i,t have negative coefficients (except for N o i,t in (b)). Furthermore, liquidity in funding markets still matters for the asset growth-leverage growth link, since liquidity, especially, in the BA market has significant coefficients for High and Low WSF groups in both specifications. Although the findings in Table 7 and 9 do not exactly match, the general conclusions of the two-step analysis concerning the impact of wholesale funding use and liquidity on Canadian banks' leverage behaviour are confirmed. 27
Conclusion
We study the extent of procyclicality of leverage in the Canadian banking sector. The study is motivated by the theory developed by Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) and empirically studied in that a link exists between funding liquidity and market liquidity through financial institutions' balance-sheet management. Our analysis utilizes a variation of the two-step empirical estimation method first proposed by Kashyap and Stein (2000) . We use monthly balance sheet data covering almost two decades and we establish that leverage is highly procyclical among Canadian financial institutions. This link depends on banks' use of wholesale funding markets and it has evolved over time. The degree of procyclicality among banks that are more dependent on wholesale funding is higher, e.g., leverage rises more rapidly as assets increase. Furthermore, the gap in the degree of procyclicality between high wholesale funding users and the rest of the banking sector has grown larger during the 2000s. We then investigate macroeconomic and market-wide variables associated with leverage procyclicality and its divergence between different wholesale funding groups. This "second step" of the analysis suggests that leverage becomes more procyclical during times of increased liquidity in repo, BA and CP markets. Finally, we argue that banking-sector leverage procyclicality is important for aggregate economy by providing empirical evidence that bankingsector leverage procyclicality forecasts aggregate or industry-wide volatility in the equity market.
Current regulations in Canada places a limit on the leverage ratio. This regulation is designed to prevent excessively high leverage but does not directly control changes in leverage. Since procyclicality of leverage could lead to aggregate volatility, current leverage regulations may not adequately address potential consequences of market and funding liquidity risks. Other regulations, such as those being discussed in the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, that enforce counter-cyclical capital holdings and directly restrict banks' balance-sheet liquidity-risk management have the potential to address this issue. However, potential costs of such regulations need to be taken into account. Table 5 : Summary of first step regression results, continued. Mean (µ) and variance (σ 2 ) for the estimated leverage growth-asset growth sensitivities are reported for the entire sample period and two sub-periods. The last two rows present tests for the equivalence of the means (µ) and variances (σ 2 ) of the estimated coefficients for the same category but across different subperiods. H 0 : σ 2 90 = σ 2 00 reports the chi-squared test statistic for a Bartlett's test for equal variance across the two sub-periods. H 0 : µ 90 = µ 00 reports the results of a F* test for the equality of the sub-sample means (robust to σ 2 90 = σ 2 00 ). The mean leverage growth-asset growth sensitivities for the No WSF group do not include the estimated coefficients for 1994 and 1995, since this group had very few banks in it during this period. *** is significant at 1% and ** represents significance at 5%.
All
High 13.79*** 4.41** 26.84*** 0.549 H 0 : µ 90 = µ 00 25.36*** 1.23 5.90** 16.74*** Table 6 : Comparison of mean leverage growth-asset growth sensitivities across different size categories for (i) the entire sample and (ii) two sub-sample periods. The differences in the mean sensitivities are calculated as "Column i -Row j" and a Welch's t-test is performed with the null hypothesis of "Mean difference = 0" (robust to unequal sample variances). The mean difference tests involving the No WSF group only include observations from January 1996 and onwards, since this group had too few banks in it prior to January 1996. *** is significant at 1% and ** is significant at 5%. 
Low WSF No WSF
